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Abstract
Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Northern Europe has increasingly aligned its national 
defence arrangements with the United States and NATO. This contrasts with the Cold War period, 
when Sweden and Finland were neutral, and Norway and Denmark put self-imposed restraints 
on their NATO memberships. Providing Northern Europe with a stable “buffer” between East 
and West, this so-called Nordic balance kept the United States and Soviet Union at an arm’s 
length. Since 2014 however, Northern Europe has de facto slid from “buffer” to “springboard” for 
US forces. This slide may counter Russian assertiveness, but there is also reason to argue that it 
may increase regional tension and unpredictability. If so, this may leave the entire region with less 
rather than more security. Using the case of Norway, it is argued that too close an alignment with 
NATO may have accelerated Norway’s role as a “springboard” for US forces. This is because cost- 
intensive reforms needed to accommodate US expectations abroad have also exacerbated critical 
vulnerabilities at home. Increased dependency on US forces thereby makes difficult the balance 
between deterrence and restraint vis-à-vis Russia. 
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1. Introduction 
Using the case of Norway, this article explores how Northern Europe can respond 
to Russian aggression without creating a security dilemma on their doorstep.1 Since 
Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008 and its annexation of Crimea in 2014, Sweden, 
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Finland, Poland, Germany and the Baltic states have been exposed to military 
rearmament, hostile intelligence gathering, and considerable power rivalry. This is 
mainly due to a deteriorating security situation in the Baltic Sea Region, where the 
United States and 19 other NATO members have deployed four multinational bat-
tlegroups to Poland and the Baltic states. As one of the most contentious regions in 
Europe, Russia argues that the presence of the US and NATO significantly reduces 
its strategic warning time.2 This has put Russian commands in Murmansk and 
St. Petersburg, and their subordinate fleets in the Barents and Baltic Seas, on high 
alert, and subsequently legitimised unexpected ‘snap exercises’, dangerous brink-
manship and violations of Swedish and Finish airspace on the part of Russia.
From a US perspective, however, military firmness is meant to stabilise the region, 
partly by deepening military cooperation with Sweden and Finland because the 
Nordic territories provide US forces with a ‘strategic depth’ that makes regional 
deterrence more credible;3 and partly by deploying a tripwire of approximately 4500 
NATO-troops from 20 member states along the Russian border to communicate 
resolve if the sovereignty of Poland, Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania is violated. 
This “tit-for-tat” logic has spurred a new security dilemma in Northern Europe. 
Ironically, it leaves all the involved states and their inhabitants with less, rather than 
more security. How the two non-alignment states of Sweden and Finland, which 
are “trapped between neutrality and NATO”4 respond to this situation, will be a 
significant determinant in shaping the regional security situation. The core challenge 
seems to revolve around a typical rim state dilemma: How can we deter Russia while 
keeping a non-provocative posture? This dilemma became more acute after Russian 
forces twice violated Georgian and Ukrainian sovereignty in 2008 and 2014, raising 
questions about who would be next. In particular, subtle efforts to pursue political 
objectives through a spectre of military and non-military instruments in Ukraine, 
Georgia and the Baltic states has fuelled Western mistrust. 
This anxiety has been exacerbated by Russia’s forward deployment of S-400 
surface-to-air missiles and nuclear-capable missile systems to Kaliningrad, and by 
Russian jets occasionally flying dangerously close to civilian and military aircraft and 
vessels in the Baltic Sea.5 Russia’s offering Eurosceptic parties in Western Europe 
cooperation, loans, political cover and propaganda has added to this, as have findings 
from the United States’ Senate Committee on Intelligence, claiming that Russian 
cyber operations towards the US presidential election in 2016 “… were more exten-
sive than the hack of the Democratic National Committee…”6
Managing tension can partly be achieved by tying US forces closer to Northern 
European defence arrangements, as in Sweden and Finland’s Host Nation Support 
arrangements with NATO and the US.7 It can also be done through a show of military 
force, as in the exercises carried out with nuclear-capable B 52H bombers and more 
than 100 western jetfighters not far from the Russian border.8 This kind of political 
communication signals deterrence, which is a way of scaring Russia into believing that 
potential costs will rapidly outweigh expected benefits if armed conflict breaks out. 
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The smaller states of Northern Europe therefore seem to emphasise deterrence over 
restraint. This strategy is not from a position of strength. Arguably, it stems from a 
position of weakness deeply rooted in national shortcomings not least inside Sweden’s 
Armed Forces.9 The extent and tempo at which Sweden and Finland abandoned their 
role as buffer states between East and West is of an unprecedented magnitude.10 From 
their role as a stabilising bridge between the Soviet Union and the United States during 
the Cold War, Sweden and Finland are – together with the previously sceptical NATO 
members Norway and Denmark – increasingly becoming key actors in a geopolitical 
standoff between the United States and Russia in Northern Europe. 
In order to discuss how Northern Europe should respond to Russian aggression, 
this article uses Norway as a case. By scrutinising Norway’s experience between 
1998 and 2018, the article first describes NATO’s effect on Norwegian security 
and defence policy. Thereafter, NATO alignment is viewed in relation to Norway’s 
contemporary policy towards Russia. Finally, three implications with relevance to 
Northern Europe are deduced, with a particular emphasis on Sweden and Finland. 
This approach allows us to analyse Norther Europe’s security problem from a new 
angle: Rather than focusing on Russian assertiveness, the focus here is on Norway’s 
alliance management. The key finding is that Norwegian alignment with NATO has 
energised its dependence on the US through Norway’s attempts to be “a good ally” 
and “best-in-class”. Loyal fulfilment of cost-intensive reforms for ‘out-of-area’ oper-
ations has led to chronic shortages of manpower, spare parts, and logistics at home. 
The implications of this is a national force that is more inclined to escalate minor 
crises with Russia. If not, a bilateral fait accompli may occur before US reinforce-
ments arrive. Time has become a critical factor. This logic provides grim prospects 
for regional diplomatic relations with Russia. As Sweden and Finland slide towards 
the West, this situation deserves attention.
The findings, which are put forward later in the text, are important. They bring 
to the table broader security implications that go beyond positive assumptions of 
a “Swedish policy of deterrence”, as presented by Fredrik Westerlund in 2017.11 
His well-crafted analysis should nevertheless be balanced by the importance of self- 
imposed restraints and assurances towards Russia. Changing Russia’s behaviour 
cannot be achieved by threatening behaviour only. Crisis-management mechanisms 
incentivising confidence, cooperation and compromise are also needed. Here, Robert 
Dalsjø and Thomas Hultmark provide valuable insight into how “the carrot and the 
stick” needs to be balanced if Russia is to change its behaviour. Unfortunately, “a 
more offensive and proactive stance to the more traditional reactive and reticent tools” 
is currently emphasised,12 and the crucial imperative of how to balance escalation 
with restraint is omitted from the discourse. Coupled with strategic guidelines from 
Sweden’s Military-Strategic Doctrine 2016, which claims that crises should be addressed 
more offensively,13 a competitive zero-sum logic seems to be more important 
than providing security gains for Sweden, Finland and Russia. First, however, the art 




One way to comprehend the impact of alliances is to describe small states’ motives 
for membership. Stephen M. Walt’s authoritative definition of alliances as “a formal 
or informal relationship between two or more sovereign states” is most commonly 
used.14 In our context however, this definition is too wide because Sweden and 
Finland are not NATO-members. As pointed out by Stein Rynning and Oliver 
Schmitt, it fails to grasp the fluid boundaries between formal allies, strategic part-
ners, and like-minded friends. Defining alliances as “a formal or informal association 
of states for the (threat of) use of military force, in specified circumstances, against 
actors external to the alliance” is more appropriate.15 While elaborating on the Nor-
wegian case, it allows us to keep two of NATO’s most valuable partners in mind.
Of particular interest is the impact of alliances in war. In other words, will alliance 
membership make member states more secure, or less secure against a neighbouring 
state’s military aggression? Most often, small states prefer alliances in order to bal-
ance a potential adversary. This is particularly so if adversaries are positioned along 
your border because such a deployment may pose an imminent threat if it serves 
the adversary’s interest.16 However, smaller states may also choose to bandwagon 
in order to “secure strategic gains despite their material disadvantage”.17 This may 
include self-imposed restraints that are meant to preclude provocation and suspi-
ciousness. But no matter what a minor client state chooses, they will always have 
to address the perennial risk of being abandoned by their patron. This threat is also 
shared by the patron, which – according to Glenn Snyder’s Alliance Politics – may 
become entrapped in wars initiated by a client state’s fear of being abandoned.18 
From a small state perspective therefore, alliance management is very much about 
balancing between a policy of invitation and a policy of restraint.19 To get “a hook in 
the nose” of a larger patron will inevitably equalise local power asymmetry vis-à-vis 
an assertive neighbour, thus providing a strong incentive to balance against the most 
dangerous threat.20 But inviting allies may also cause unnecessary and excessive 
power rivalry and militarisation on the client’s territory. Such a situation may easily 
induce a spiral of tension and mistrust, which again ends up in a security dilemma 
where all states – large and small – become less secure rather than more.21 A certain 
degree of bandwagoning towards potential adversaries may therefore be necessary, 
not least to preclude suspiciousness from neighbours who are easily provoked.
In theory as in practice therefore, finding the right balance between “the carrot and 
the stick” is difficult. This is particularly so when the client needs the patron more 
than the other way around. Smaller states that depend upon foreign aid are more 
anxious of being marginalised, which is why they often put aside myopic national 
interests for the sake of a common good together with the patron. Being perceived as 
a “free-rider” would be detrimental, as egoistic behaviour undermines the ties that 
bind larger and smaller states together in a common destiny. As a sign of obedience 
and loyalty therefore, clients are more inclined to accommodate allied injunctions 
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set forth by its patron. This may ultimately foster a shared sense of mutual respect, 
recognition and reciprocity for each other’s security needs. It may even provide the 
client with more attention and access to the patron’s ear. This is why, according to 
Walt, smaller states seek alliances with a larger state.
As seen from an external neighbour’s perspective, this kind of alliance management 
is not without problems. This is because a client’s benevolence towards its patron also 
leads to a shift in the local balance of power. The client will therefore have a common 
interest with the suspicious neighbour in keeping the level of militarisation as low as 
possible, almost as “a secret pact”.22 But at the same time, obedience to a patron’s 
expectations also needs to be displayed through firm commitments. Because of this, 
clients easily end up in situations where the patron becomes increasingly influential. 
Dependency on the patron therefore makes it difficult to balance between allied 
expectations and assurances towards an (increasingly) suspicious neighbour. 
This may ultimately lead to a change in the security strategy of the small state. 
Rather than focusing on absolute security for the small state and its neighbour, ‘secu-
rity’ becomes an indivisible asset in a ‘relative zero-sum game’, with the client and 
patron situated on one side, and an increasingly assertive neighbour on the other. 
Based on these theoretical assumptions, it is likely that Norway’s alliance manage-
ment in NATO is characterised by a constant fear of US abandonment. This anxi-
ety is a primary motive for gaining as much security as possible through a strategy 
of accommodation in NATO. Even though this may stir increased Russian appre-
hension, the unilateral quest for Norwegian security nevertheless invokes a stronger 
incentive for being perceived as “a good ally”. This logic can be operationalised into 
four indicators. Put into a Norwegian context, the practical expression of this would 
be a constant striving for (1) attention and (2) access to decision making bodies in 
the US and NATO, and incentives for (3) loyalty and (4) obedience inside these 
institutional bodies. 
3. NATO’s Effect on Norway
Since the early 1990s, NATO has been instrumental in America’s efforts to reform 
European forces into more deployable and combat-ready units that can sustain and 
protect themselves in ‘out-of-area’ operations.23 Of particular importance are expedi-
tionary qualities such as strategic deployability, tactical mobility and high readiness. 
These qualities have been pursued through various NATO defence programmes, 
such as Defence Capability Initiative (1998), Prague Capability Commitment (2002), 
Smart Defence (2011), and Connected Forces Initiative (2012). They are a program-
matic expression of US expectations set forth by the Pentagon towards NATO cli-
ents in Europe. Throughout the 1990s and well into the new millennium, Norway 
has pursued an active downscaling and force reduction at home in order to reallocate 
resources for new investments. The rationale is, according to the Norwegian Ministry 
of Defence, based upon expectations of US assistance against Russia: “International 
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operations in an allied framework is an investment which is meant to ensure that also 
Norway receives allied reinforcements if we need it”.24
3.1 Attention
By actively accommodating the defence programmes above, Norway has increased 
its ability to share risks and burdens abroad. However, shifting from quantity to 
quality has also accelerated the financial imbalance between operating costs and new 
investments at home.25 Meeting US expectations in NATO is nevertheless regarded 
as more important than maintaining a larger, more sustainable but less sophisticated 
force for self-help and territorial border defence only, a post-Cold War logic in effect 
when Russia was still seen as a partner in Northern Europe, until 2006–2007. 
Reducing military capacity, even at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, is a 
strong symbol of NATO adjustment. Norway’s response can therefore be seen as an 
effort to keep US leadership and interests alive in Europe, which during the 1990s 
involved burden and risk sharing in the Balkans. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
in 2001, this has spiralled into a global commitment of accommodating US secu-
rity requirements in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Mali, Libya and Niger, as well as in 
the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. US discontent with its European allies, 
uttered through statements such as those made by senior Congress members follow-
ing 9/11, made a particular impression: 
Some Americans have lost confidence in the Alliance. Years of cuts in defense spending and 
failure to meet pledge after pledge to improve European military capabilities has left some 
Americans with doubts as to what our allies could realistically contribute …. The US did have 
confidence in a selected group of allies [following NATO’s response to 9/11]. But it did not 
have confidence in the institution that is NATO.26
By constructively participating in US led efforts to pool European defence resources, 
Norway stands forth as an example of how to manage allied obligations. Since the 
inauguration of NATO’s Defence Capability Initiative, the ambition to ensure US 
relevancy has been of paramount importance. According to former Defence Min-
ister (2001–2005) Kristin Krohn Devold, “To reach this goal, it is important for 
Norway to be among ‘the best in the NATO class’. That is crucial for being counted 
on”.27 Examples of this are found in Norwegian Special Forces’ assignments to men-
tor local security forces and militias in Afghanistan, Iraq, Jordan and Syria, which 
gained positive attention in the United States. Even more attention was gained by 
the sophisticated signal intelligence provided to US and Coalition forces during 
counterterrorist operations in ISAF (2003–2014), and by the risky air raids carried 
out on Muammar Gadhafi’s command centre in densely populated Tripoli during 
the 2011 Libyan war.28 Receiving positive credentials from US Congress members, 
such as “Best-in-class” and Gold star”, is crucial for a small state that needs to nur-




Norway’s alliance management in NATO also makes it easier to access US deci-
sion-making processes. Working from within cooperative processes rather than from 
the outside, Norway’s national security interests can be voiced more clearly. The 
logic is simple but effective: By adapting to US expeditionary requirements abroad, 
Norwegian defence officials have been elevated into processes dominated by its key 
security provider, which is also the world’s sole military superpower. Because Norway 
can deliver relevant capabilities that the United States needs in Central Asia or in 
the Middle East, Norwegian politicians and civil servants are given access to key 
policymakers in the White House, Pentagon and State Department, or even to the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as was the case when Norwegian Prime 
Minister Erna Solberg’s visited President Donald Trump in January 2018.30 Such 
events enable clients to cultivate policymakers and decision makers from within, not 
least patrons who – through Norwegian surveillance of Russian strategic submarines 
– are directly related to US security interests in Northern Europe. 
The quest for access is consistent with comments made by former US Ambassador 
to NATO (2001–2005), Nicholas Burns. His claim that “Norway is a country that 
‘punches above its weight’ – meaning it is a country that has an influence beyond the 
size of the country itself”,31 was largely because Norway deployed Special Forces to 
Afghanistan at an early stage after 9/11.32 The same recognition was also reiterated 
in 2016 when Defence Secretary (2015–2017) Ashton Carter praised Norway for its 
military reforms, and its valuable contribution in the “war against the Islamic State 
in Syria”. Following the Secretary, the Norwegian Defence Minister 
… was part of a core group of members that I convened last year from the counter-ISIL 
coalition… Norway is taking seriously the challenges of this area and adapting its armed forces. 
The United States appreciates this commitment and stands by [Norway] to assist in any way 
we can.33 
Using NATO to enhance Norway’s access to key US decision makers is also con-
firmed by defence officials in the Pentagon. As Europe’s military transformation 
gained momentum after 9/11, officials from the Pentagon’s Office of the Secretary 
of Defence claimed that Norway, due to its positive attitude, enjoyed “tremendous 
access to decision-making processes, not only in the Pentagon, but also in the State 
Department. A major part of this is due to your excellent reputation, particularly as 
a proactive country that takes transformation seriously”.34 
Norwegian benevolence towards US preferences is not a new approach. As pointed 
out by the two historians Rolf Tamnes and Knut Einar Eriksen, during the Cold War 
“… an important guidance in the Norwegian alliance policy was to seek influence 
by demonstrating a deliberate intention to co-operate”.35 Spectacular events, such 
as the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, the effort to protect Libyan 
civilians in 2011, or counter the Islamic State’s rapid expansion in 2014, are typical 
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“windows of opportunities” to display, confirm and consolidate long-standing ties 
with the preeminent security provider against Russia.
3.3 Loyalty
Fearing US abandonment in Northern Europe, Norway’s alliance management is 
also incentivised by loyalty. By firmly supporting US proposals concerning how 
NATO-Europe may improve its scarce defence resources more effectively, Norway 
is able to undertake a constructive role in any consultation with US defence officials. 
On this basis, a more effective approach towards joint, common and multinational 
defence planning – and acquisition of increasingly expensive capabilities – can pro-
ceed. The outcome is potentially far larger than Norway, which spends 1.6 per cent 
of its GDP on defence, can afford alone. Norway’s long-term security motive is to 
maintain and strengthen bilateral ties with the US, as this makes it easier to bal-
ance Russia in the High North. Issue linkages between US injunctions on NATO’s 
defence programmes, burden sharing abroad, and critique of Russia, thereby explain 
much of Norway’s loyalty. Given Norway’s dependency on US forces, efforts to 
refine a common set of security interests across the Atlantic gives more security 
than pursuing myopic interests alone. The alternative of forging a territorial force 
will only have grave repercussions; US reciprocity in Northern Europe will neither 
be institutionalised nor revitalised if Norway becomes irrelevant to US security con-
cerns abroad.36
Loyalty is even more important as NATO’s defence programmes are launched 
by Norway’s closest ally. Uncertainty as to where the Trump administration may 
go in international politics makes a committed posture even more important.37 A 
constructive approach thereby signifies Norwegian commitment to keeping NATO 
relevant. A dispiriting “two-tier NATO”, or even a more “fragmented NATO”, 38 
could involve a dysfunctional division of labour that ultimately makes the Alliance 
less credible in Northern Europe. As Krohn Devold pointed out to the Norwe-
gian Chief of Defence in 2002, “NATO […] is our primary point of reference. 
Any national capability that does not have a function abroad is to be given low 
priority”.39 Norwegian investments that provide for this flexibility have been a key 
imperative ever since. Fearing prospects of political and military marginalisation, it 
is crucial that Norway and the rest of NATO-Europe, according to Defence Minis-
ter (2013–2017) Ine M. Eriksen Søreide, “[looks] beyond its own borders in order 
to take co-responsibility for global security” – as “credible US engagement and 
leadership is vital”.40
3.4 Obedience
Obedience to US injunctions has also allowed Norway to give up keeping a balanced 
force without exposing national security to intolerable risks. From being able to 
mobilise more than 400,000 troops from the civil society during the Cold War,41 the 
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present force structure consists of approximately 12,000 uniformed and 5,300 civil-
ian personnel. The dramatic downsizing incentivises Norway to harmonise and inte-
grate its defence plans with the United States inside the NATO-framework. In order 
to cope with declining defence budgets and escalating costs on more deployable 
troops, Norway obediently renounces a more sustainable force that otherwise would 
have provided national authorities more resilience in Northern Europe. Hence, col-
lective arrangements in NATO also make it easier to change procurement policies 
towards increased role specialisation, e.g. on Special Forces, signal intelligence, sub-
marines and maritime patrol aircraft. 
According to Norwegian defence officials, this was one of the key reasons why 
Norway gave up its balanced force structure in the 1990s: “Even though the American 
Defence Capability Initiative would make a balanced force structure hard to main-
tain, it would at least enhance mutual trust and confidence”.42 Obedience to allied 
injunctions is as such an important institutional mechanism that makes NATO a 
unique institution, and upon which small states like Norway are investing an increas-
ingly large part of their security. By relating alliance management to issues of more 
far-reaching concern, such as the US drift from Europe, abstaining military capac-
ities even in the lower end of the conflict spectrum is a necessary or even inevitable 
sacrifice.
4. Empirical findings from Norway
Based upon the four indicators from alliance theory, two conclusions can be deduced. 
First, NATO membership has made it both politically legitimate and militarily fea-
sible to downsize, rationalise and abnegate territorial defence in order to finance 
expeditionary forces. This was particularly so up to 2006–2007, when Russia was 
still seen as a partner and friend. Even though prioritising quality over quantity 
has increased Norway’s military vulnerability vis-à-vis Russia, and even though US 
expectations of burden-sharing in Central Asia and the Middle East have accelerated 
the imbalance between operating costs and investments, being “a good ally” has 
exalted Norway’s status in the United States.43 Norway’s inability to address even 
minor crises in the lower end of the conflict spectrum is therefore seen as a calcu-
lated risk, but with one serious implication: Even at an early stage in a potentially 
tense situation with Russia, rapid deployment of US forces is imperative. 
Secondly, Norwegian alignment with NATO’s reforms has reduced Norway’s 
diplomatic room for manoeuvre. Whereas Norway’s territorial force from the 1980s 
was expected to pursue defensive delay operations for more than eight weeks, the 
present force is unlikely to operate efficiently for more than a few days. This means 
that Norwegian diplomats have little time to solve crises, tensions or address bilat-
eral misperceptions before the military command structure and its subordinate 
air, land and sea units start to deteriorate. Delegating national defence tasks to an 
alliance that consists of 29 very different nations, and where NATO’s command 
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structure also suffers from serious inadequacies, thereby makes it riskier to under-
score diplomatic efforts with national forces in the High North. If minor conflicts 
arise on NATO’s northern flank, Norway will not be able to fortify diplomatic dia-
logue with an adequate military force, because the military will immediately start 
to disintegrate. 
How does this weakness affect Norway’s strategy towards Russia?
5. Implications of Norway’s policy towards Russia 
Norwegian willing compliance with allied injunctions has contributed to making 
Norway a “small middle power” in Europe.44 This is because NATO guidance has 
helped Norway stir a military transformation that has channelled scarce resources 
from a large mobilisation force into a more agile professional force. Despite a lack 
of sustainability however, prospects for more permanent US reinforcements – seen 
since 2014 – have to some extent eased Norwegian apprehensions. This is particu-
larly so as Russian “snap exercises” and cyberattacks towards critical infrastructure 
have increased over the past few years.45 Burden sharing in Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Syria, as well as intensified intelligence gathering towards Russia’s Northern Fleet 
have nevertheless cemented transatlantic ties. This logic has long roots in Norwe-
gian strategic thinking. According to Defence Minister (1986–1989) Johan Jørgen 
Holst, a potential crisis with Russia should not end up as a war with Norway, but 
rather as a war about Norway.46 Burden sharing abroad would make it easier to get 
US attention and support if a Norwegian tripwire needed to be triggered in the High 
North. This burden sharing takes place in part through military channels in the 
Norwegian Intelligence Service, as well as in various parts of the Navy, Air Force 
and Special Forces commands, which on a daily basis operate closely with US forces 
in the United States, Norway, Belgium, Germany, Jordan, Iraq and the United Arab 
Emirates. It also occurs through Norway’s extensive diplomatic networks embodied 
in the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs, which on a daily basis cultivates US 
ties in Washington D.C., Brussels and London.47 Norway’s fears of abandonment 
by NATO have been allayed, in accordance with Snyder’s theoretical assumptions.
In addition, these networks can be interpreted as a sort of deterrence towards 
Russia. A more visible US presence in Norwegian airspace and territorial waters, 
as well as in the northern counties of Finnmark, Troms and Trøndelag under-
scores a more credible US deterrent component in Northern Europe. Combined 
with updated reinforcement and readiness plans, as well as more allied exercises, 
this enhanced NATO presence sends the signal to Russia that Norwegian and US 
security are inseparable, at least in theory. The credibility of this claim is further 
seen through a softening of previously self-imposed restraints, such as restrictions 
on allied bases and exercises closer to Russia’s second strike capability on the Kola 
Peninsula. Other examples are found in the US Marine Corps’ presence on a rota-
tional basis in Mid-Norway,48 high intensity combat exercises in Finnmark county 
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with extensive US participation,49 new infrastructure for US Air Forces in southeast 
Norway, and new facilities for the US ground forces in Troms county.50 These devel-
opments are consistent with Walt’s expectation of a small state’s balancing behaviour 
towards an assertive neighbour. 
Coupled with more security arrangements between Sweden, Finland, the US and 
NATO, Norway’s renewed “policy of invitation” has tied US commitments more 
explicitly to the Nordic states’ national security concerns. Vulnerable states on Rus-
sia’s border are assured, while the United States gets a firmer grip on the geopolit-
ical challenge of providing Baltic NATO allies with credible reinforcements while 
preventing Russian submarines and aircraft access to the North Atlantic. Lifting 
the Cold War’s self-imposed restraints can be interpreted as a way of compensat-
ing for the abnegation of a sustainable territorial force, which during the 1980s 
enabled Norway to solve national episodes, incidents and crises alone – and even 
sustain national operations for more than four weeks.51 The contemporary absence 
of trimmed and well-functioning command structure in NATO increases the validity 
of this perspective.52
5.1 The Disadvantage of Allied Compliance
Relinquishing an adequate defence in the lower end of the conflict spectrum has 
long-term implications. The most serious but often neglected side effect is that Nor-
wegian forces have become more inclined to pursue a more robust combat posture 
closer to Russia’s border. This means that deterrence is favoured before restraint; the 
“stick” becomes more important than the “carrot”. Minor bilateral events, episodes 
and crises are more likely to escalate than de-escalate, at least up to the point where 
Russian forces consider withdrawing out of fear of possible US involvement. How 
can this slide towards a more robust combat posture be explained? 
Propensities to go on the offensive are closely linked to inadequate sustainability, 
which is a key characteristic for smaller allies that have undergone a cost-inten-
sive transformation in NATO. Lack of volume and sustainability therefore makes 
it more rational to communicate resolve and combat agility. This is because a deci-
sive outcome becomes critically important on short notice – preferably within a few 
days. The alternative, which would be a prolonged and indecisive situation, would 
instantly stir operative deterioration and a subsequent collapse before a clear polit-
ical outcome has been reached. This is because troops that are put on a ‘24–7’ alert 
status face grave problems in sustaining agility without the constant support of suf-
ficient logistics, maintenance and extra troops. 
Ambiguous incidents, episodes or crises that are neither proper war nor proper 
peace, but something in between, may thereby reduce prospects for rapid assistance, 
and may ultimately lead to a diplomatic fait accompli where Norway ends up in a 
bilateral crisis with Russia before a US tripwire has been activated. This would com-
plicate the Norwegian Armed Forces’ strategy, which – in the wording of former 
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Chief of Defence (2005–2009) General Sverre Diesen – is as follows: faced with “… 
a limited military provocation, Norwegian forces must […] create a conflict which 
is so intense that our allies, due to reasons of national and collective credibility, are 
forced to get involved”.53 
By default, then, Norwegian forces might be forced to pursue an aggressive 
“deterrence by punishment” 54 strategy in situations where disputes could be solved 
diplomatically with more patience, and a more cautious modus operandi. Maintaining 
a more agile force closer to Russia’s border counteracts a defensive posture, which 
during the Cold War was accomplished by a strategy labelled “deterrence by denial” 
in Troms county, approximately 1000 kilometres from the Russian border.55 
Norway’s slide towards a more agile posture is underscored by empirical evidence 
from the Norwegian Defence Concept. Since 2012, the threshold defence concept 
has emphasised deterrence rather than assurance towards Russia.56 By rapidly rais-
ing the costs of aggression, scaring Russia from assertive action has become more 
important than pursuing self-restraints as a means of building confidence. Mov-
ing more forces closer to the Northern Fleet thereby challenges Norway’s previous 
self-imposed restraints codified in limitations on US exercises in Finnmark, or US 
bases in Trøndelag and Troms in peacetime.57 During the Cold War, keeping military 
forces further away from the border provided both Russia and Norway with longer 
strategic warning time.58 As these restraints have been removed, Norway’s strategy 
towards Russia has also evolved. From following a logic of absolute security for both 
states during the Cold War, which according to Johan Jørgen Holst was called “a 
silent cooperation”,59 the contemporary strategy seems to emphasise relative security 
for Norway at the expense of Russia. More emphasis on this kind of ‘zero-sum’ logic 
is also found in the political rhetoric of the Stoltenberg-II (2009–2013) and the 
Solberg Governments (2013–).60 Empirical evidence is also found in the conceptual 
idea of Threshold defence,61 as well as in the pattern of contemporary joint exercises. 
According to Norwegian senior staff officers, NATO exercises, such as Cold Response, 
are more focused on rehearsing high intensity warfare after “deterrence failed”, than 
on mechanisms for de-escalation, mediation, and civil-military cooperation, which 
characterised most of the joint exercises between 2002 and 2010.62
6. Conclusion
Based on the Norwegian case, how should Northern Europe respond to the  Russian 
assertiveness? Is closer integration into Western security arrangements a viable 
approach, e.g. for smaller non-aligned states like Sweden and Finland? Three con-
clusions can be deduced. 
First, as Northern Europe increasingly aligns with the US and other NATO 
forces, states like Sweden and Finland may more easily gain access to US decision 
makers. From this vantage point, national concerns can be voiced more clearly in 
tough competition with numerous other European allies striving for US attention 
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and reinforcements. Such access increases US awareness, and thus prospects for 
successful activation of US security guaranties if needed. This logic is anchored in 
the traditional tenets of alliance theory, where balancing is more commonly pursued 
by smaller states than bandwagoning.63 
But such a strategy may also increase the risk of more tension, instability and 
unpredictability. This is arguably so because Russia’s strategic forces will need an 
extended zone of security to protect their forces from US or other NATO allies’ 
precision guided missiles. As an extended part of Northern Europe opens up for 
US and NATO operations on their own territories, this reassuring effect could be 
nullified by Russian counter efforts aiming to protect its force. Balancing with the 
stronger part thereby creates a typical security dilemma because Russia, according to 
Snyder, will respond with more assertiveness.64 In particular, Sweden and Finland’s 
slide from “buffer” to “springboard” may increase the risk of geopolitical change in 
Northern Europe. This is because both states’ territories play a more prominent role 
in US and Russian defence planning. 
It can be argued that this is not likely to provide the population with more security 
because their national territories will be more exposed to unwanted Russian atten-
tion necessary for military planning and readiness. A question for further research 
could be to examine to what extent accelerated Nordic-Baltic defence cooperation 
could alleviate a situation where smaller states more vigorously can address a mili-
tary vacuum currently filled by US and Russian forces. 
Second, the slide from “buffer” to “springboard” also means that domestic policy 
in Sweden and Finland will be more exposed to US expectations and demands. 
Based on the Norwegian experience, this is particularly so with regard to US expec-
tations of reciprocity abroad. As in the case of Norway and Denmark, more troops 
from Northern Europe will be expected to participate in open-ended engagements 
in Central Asia, the Middle East and possibly Africa. This logic is consistent with 
another alliance dilemma raised by Snyder, which is that clients may easily become 
entrapped into a patron’s war elsewhere because clients are afraid of being aban-
doned at home.65 
Deployments abroad may on the one hand energise combat experience and crit-
ical competence among forces that will also operate at home. But they may also 
increase the risk of fragmentation and critical shortcomings within a national force 
structure that needs to be cohesively trained at home. Vulnerabilities deriving from 
this over-stretch problématique may accelerate US dependency because simultaneous 
engagements abroad and at home are detrimental to small states’ military readi-
ness and cohesiveness in the lower end of the conflict spectre. This trend, it may 
be argued, may hamper efforts undertaken by small states, such as Sweden and 
Finland, to exert influence on how the strategic balance between deterrence and 
restraint can be tailored vis-a-vis Russia. 
A question for further research however, would be falsify this assumption, and 
explore alternative ways to cope with small states’ endemic over-stretch problématique. 
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Could it be that “pooling and sharing” among small states would provide more secu-
rity than outsourcing defence responsibilities to US forces even at the lower end of 
the conflict spectrum? 
Third, increased US dependency may increase the risk of energising a “cult of the 
offensive” among smaller states in Northern Europe. While dependency may favour 
integration and interoperability among like-minded states in the West, it may also 
lead to a deterioration in diplomatic relations with Russia. This is because national 
vulnerabilities make smaller states more inclined to escalate rather than de-escalate 
tense situations; seeking to avoid a fait accompli with Russia, a decisive outcome on 
short notice will be required in order to trigger a US tripwire. 
Such a strategy may – in a narrow sense – provide more security for Northern 
Europe because Russia will gain less security in relative terms. But in absolute terms, 
it will also, in accordance with the logic put forth by both Schelling and Holst, cre-
ate less security for Northern Europe and Russia. This is because US forces will be 
increasingly important at a much earlier stage in a potentially tense situation, which 
forces Russia to take precautionary efforts.66 It is important to note that Russia does 
not fear the smaller states in Northern Europe. Russia only fears that the region 
will become a ‘stepping stone’ for US operations towards Russia. A question for 
further research could therefore be to what extent self-imposed restraints put forth 
by smaller North European states are possible without displaying weakness and thus 
invoking more Russian assertiveness. Could stronger mutual dependency between 
Russia and Northern Europe, e.g. on energy and trade, alleviate some of the military 
tension currently fuelling the regional security situation? 
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